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conditions” 
                              Hannibal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
“The Concept of Amnesty in the Crossfire between International Criminal Law 
and Transitional Justice” 
 
I. Introduction 
Transitional justice is distinct from “ordinary justice” because of the fact that it 
has to deal with large-scale and especially serious abuses committed or tolerated 
by a normally authoritarian regime within the framework of a military or at least 
violent socio-political conflict.1 Political transition may be accompanied by am-
nesties, prosecution in national courts, and prosecution in international tribunals 
or a combination of these, each having its benefits and its drawbacks and no doubt 
the future understanding of transitional justice will involve an appreciation of the 
need for all of these, sometimes in combination, depending on the particular con-
text.2 
This question of how to deal with the past in transitional phases moves some-
where between the study of international (criminal) law and the relatively new 
study of transitional justice. The latter involves political, historical and societal 
considerations. The extent of severity of past violations, the prior history of dem-
ocratic rule of the country, the number of victims, the extent of complicity by the 
citizenry, cultural and historical traditions, the stability of the new government, 
the media and the economy provide a unique context in each case. This multidis-
ciplinary nature of the topic is what makes it so difficult, yet so interesting, to deal 
with at the same time. 
                                                           
1
 Kai Ambos, The Legal Framework of Transitional Justice: Study Prepared for the International Conference 
‘Building a Future on Peace and Justice’ Nuremberg, 25-27 June 2007, Nuremberg 2007, 7. 
2
Andreas O’Shea, Amnesty for Crime in International Law and Practice, Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2004, 96. 
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Amnesty is a mechanism that is increasingly employed in transitional justice as an 
alternative means to punishment in a world that increasingly demands the pu-
nishment of individuals who commit international crimes.3  
That is exactly the field of tension that this research paper will deal with. 
The concept of amnesty belongs to the grey area of international (criminal) law 
and the international law applicable to amnesties has been characterised by a lack 
of coherence and clarity4 due to the fact that the legal, political, and moral choices 
involved are only to some degree shaped by the requirements of the international 
community, which makes the issue of impunity so complex, evoking impassioned 
debate5. 
Starting with the concept of amnesty itself, its different variations, basic ideas and 
historical development, this study describes its relationship to international (crim-
inal) law where amnesty at first sight appears to be an incongruous element. 
On the other hand, there is a need for amnesty from the point of view of the study 
of transitional justice where amnesty is an accepted tool being used by states in 
phases of transition and dealing with past atrocities. For this reason, I would like 
to place amnesty within the framework of punishment and international law by 
establishing guidelines for acceptable amnesties. 
Next, the discussion will turn to the relation of amnesties to the International 
Criminal Court and, finally, I will propose the “selective prosecution approach” 
which, in my opinion, is the best choice of actions in transitional phases. 
                                                           
3
 Ibid., 33. 
4
 Ibid., 1. 
5
 Naomi Roth-Arriaza, Impunity and Human Rights in International Law and Practice, New York, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995, 5. 
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II. The Definition of Amnesty, its Variations and Historical Development 
The word “amnesty” has its origin in the Ancient Greek word “amnestia” mean-
ing oblivion.6 An Act of oblivion, on the other hand, can be defined as a general 
overlooking or pardon of past offences by the ruling authority7. The sole percep-
tion – understood literally and connected to crimes and the concept of liability – 
connotes a negative aftertaste and automatically prick one’s ears, keeping in mind 
that “oblivion” comes close to “losing sight of something” or “forgetting”. 
When it comes to attempts to define “amnesty” one cannot say that there is a stan-
dard definition of the term but rather various proposals. So amnesty could, for 
instance, be defined as “immunity in law from either criminal or civil legal conse-
quences, or from both, for wrongs committed in the past in a political context8”. 
This definition separates amnesty from other related terms and gets to the point of 
summing up the most important aspects related to the concept. Specifically, the 
most important aspects are the facts that the immunity is in law, that one distin-
guishes immunity from its criminal law and civil law consequences and that the 
conduct in respect of which immunity from prosecution has been granted, is 
placed in a political context. 
1) Distinction between Amnesty and Impunity 
The immunity is in law because of having the force of law9 and that is what dis-
tinguishes the concept of amnesty from that of impunity, which is a broader no-
tion that incorporates amnesty and does not necessarily depend on legal authori-
                                                           
6
 O’Shea (2004), 5. 
7
 The Oxford English Dictionary, 2
nd
 ed. 
8
 O’Shea (2004), 1, 2. 
9
 Ibid., 2. 
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ty10. In other words, the concept of impunity lacks the attribute “immunity in 
law”. 
2) Distinction between Amnesty and Pardon, Oblivion, Respectively 
In the case of amnesty, we are concerned with offences committed in a political 
context11. This is an important aspect in the definition because it distinguishes 
amnesty from pardon.12 In fact, these two legal concepts share the same conse-
quences in law. Both of the devices result in a person obtaining immunity under 
both the criminal and civil law. Both may take their effect at any stage of the legal 
proceedings and, finally, both do not affect the legality of the conduct, but merely 
the release of the accused from trial, or a guilty person from the legal conse-
quences of his admittedly illegal act. Both concepts also share the same religious 
element of forgiveness. Yet, the two concepts are not the same, and one can sepa-
rate them according to their different purposes and origins. Amnesty is primarily 
aimed at promoting peace or reconciliation. Pardon, in turn, is a mechanism at the 
discretionary use of a head of state to sidestep the court. It is based on the absolute 
power of a head of state and it serves some undefined public purpose, and it usual-
ly involves obtaining something useful from the beneficiary of the pardon, or pre-
venting or correcting a mistake in the conviction of an innocent person.13 There-
fore, while pardon originates in the absolute power of sovereigns, amnesty, on the 
other hand, has its origins in attempts to promote peace between two or more war-
ring parties, and to ensure lasting victory over conquered territory.14  
                                                           
10
 Ibid., 2. 
11
 Ibid., 73, 74. 
12
 Ibid., 2. 
13
 Ibid., 2. 
14
 Ibid., 3. 
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Moreover, although there is surely an area of overlap between the concepts of 
amnesty and pardon, a clear differentiator is the fact that the term “amnesty” be-
longs more to international law15 while “pardon” and “reprieve” are clearly insti-
tutions of national law,16 normally made by the head of state in sensitive cases 
with a strong public appeal. Revisiting the aspect of “the political context” once 
again, amnesty and oblivion might be practically synonymous, except that an am-
nesty is understood to be a specific form of oblivion in the context of war17. Con-
sequently, pardon is granted to individuals on the basis of individualised consider-
ations, whereas amnesty is granted to groups on the basis of public policy con-
cerns. Finally, it is to mention that pardon generally does not vitiate guilt for the 
underlying offence, whereas amnesty operates as an extinction of the offence it-
self.18 
3) Amnesty from Criminal and/or Civil Liability 
Most amnesties operate solely within the criminal justice arena, but an amnesty 
(law) may indemnify an individual not only against criminal prosecution and pu-
nishment and eliminate his criminal responsibility, but also against civil actions.19 
In simple terms, the consequences of an amnesty from criminal liability have a 
wider societal reach (concerning for instance the society or the state as an entity), 
while those of an amnesty from civil liability affect the non-indemnified individu-
al more directly and are more perceptible for him. This paper will deal primarily 
and in main with the former but it also will focus on selected points of the letter. 
 
                                                           
15
 Noted by the US Court of Claims in Knote v US, 10 Ct.Cl. 407. 
16
 O’Shea (2004), 3. 
17
 O’Shea (2004), 8. 
18
 Roth-Arriaza (1995), 22. 
19
 O’Shea (2004), 73. 
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4) Variations of Amnesty   
Amnesties manifest themselves in theory and practice in different variations. For 
example, there are self (-protecting) amnesties, conditional amnesties (interplay of 
an amnesty with conditions or even other mechanisms), blanket amnesties (cover-
ing all offences20) or general amnesties (covering all perpetrators), the latter two 
also being combined under the term “across-the-board exemptions”. 
National amnesties, such as amnesties favouring ordinary criminals, amnesties 
granted on the occasion of certain festivities, or so-called corrective amnesties 
used to reverse an injustice, are not the subject of this study as they are neither 
connected to international criminal law nor to transitional justice. 
5) Historical Development  
a) Arena of Internal Conflicts 
In the past amnesties were granted in civil wars as an incentive to quell rebellions 
or riots21. Famous examples of civil insurrection are the American war of inde-
pendence and the American Civil War. 
Amnesty is still used to quell or discourage rebellion in the context of civil wars22. 
Its use in civil strife has received wide recognition, and there are a number of ex-
amples of its use in practice in post-war internal conflicts.23 One could even find 
evidence of a revival of amnesty clauses – rejuvenating the philosophy of recon-
ciliation - after internal conflicts in the peace agreements for Burundi and Sierra 
                                                           
20
 Ibid., 41. 
21
 Ibid., 6. 
22
 Ibid., 22. 
23
 Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Burundi, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colum-
bia, Croatia, Cyprus, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana, Haiti, Jordan, Mauritania, Mauritius, Nepal, Oman, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Syria, Serbia and Zaire (now the Democratic Re-
public of Congo). – Ibid., 22. 
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Leone.24, where, in the Sierra Leonean case, the government stated that without an 
offer of amnesty and pardon, the Lomé Peace Agreement would not have come 
into existence25.  
b) Arena of International Conflicts 
In international conflicts the strategy of granting amnesty thrived as a means of 
maintaining peace between former warring states and became a strong feature of 
peace settlements.26 The extent to which it was used is evidenced by the fact that 
when parties concluded a peace treaty, amnesty was scheduled in the first article 
of the peace agreement. And even where it was not expressly mentioned, is was 
assumed tacitly27, the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 being a well-known example28. 
The European experience of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries demonstrates 
that amnesty was most likely to be adopted for two reasons: when there was no 
clear victor29, and where the negotiating parties were firmly and genuinely deter-
mined to establish a lasting peace.30 In line with this historical application of am-
nesties, even today the need for amnesty arises in the context of international con-
flicts, as has been seen and, indeed is most evident when, on the one hand, there is 
no clear victor who is able to assume command of the state power and, on the oth-
er hand, where the prevailing situation requires a mechanism which primarily 
would be able to ensure a lasting easing of tension. 
 
 
                                                           
24
 Ibid., 22, 23. 
25
 Ambos (2007), 9. 
26
 O’Shea (2004), 7. 
27
 Christian Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum, 1764, V. II, para. 989. 
28
 O’Shea (2004), 8. 
29
 Ibid., 16. 
30
 Ibid., 15. 
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c) The Scheme of Combating Impunity 
The model of combating impunity, the ideological antithesis of the concept of 
amnesty, emerges in the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 which contained provisions 
for the prosecution of the German Kaiser31, thus starting the trend to prosecute 
and punish invariably those responsible for what subsequently became known as 
international crimes. The Treaty of Sevres of 1920 continued this tradition, envi-
saging the prosecution of Turks for the massacre of Armenians.  But this was still 
premature and this project was terminated by the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, 
which provided for a general amnesty and is a notable example of amnesty being 
granted for the worst excesses of inhumanity.32 
By virtue of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 the prohibition on the use of force 
found its place in international law and with the adoption of the UN Charter (es-
pecially Article 2 (4)) it became an established international law norm. The adop-
tion of the UN Charter resulted in the perception that the need for amnesty provi-
sions in peace treaties had gradually subsided.33 The prohibition on the use of 
force, if taken seriously, necessarily led to the establishment of precautionary 
measures in cases where the norm was breached. This, in turn, paved the way for 
the concept of impunity first and foremost, and away from that of amnesty. Con-
sequently, amnesty as a means of reconciliation with the enemy did not form a 
major component of the ending of the Second World War, but the victors rather 
deliberately sought the international prosecution of those who had waged the war 
of aggression.34 
                                                           
31
 Ibid., 15. 
32
 Ibid., 15. 
33
 Ibid., 15. 
34
 Ibid., 16. 
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Even though it might appear that the concept of amnesty lost significance or be-
came less important, this is not so. On the one hand, we note that, in contrast to 
the treatment of the enemy, the Allies of both the major wars ensured complete 
amnesty for those who acted in support of the war effort against the enemy.35 
And, on the other hand, it was in fact this development of the growing tension 
between the idea of impunity and the concept of amnesty which actually led to the 
problem of accommodating the concept of amnesty within the context of interna-
tional (criminal) law and its regime. This is to say, it is due to this historical de-
velopment that we now have to face the question of how to find a place for the 
concept of amnesty within international (criminal) law. 
 
III. International (Criminal) Law Provisions Referring to Amnesty Directly 
and the Duty to Prosecute 
There are no direct references to the question of amnesty in international instru-
ments, Article 6 (5) of the 1977 Additional Protocol II to the four Geneva Con-
ventions of 194936 being an exemption, but even this provision, as far as it con-
cerns amnesty, is merely advisory. 37 It does not have the meaning and scope oc-
casionally attributed to it, namely, to oblige the authorities in power to endeavour 
to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the 
armed conflict, but it only states that a “combatant impunity” should be granted to 
“normal soldiers”. It does not address the issue of criminal responsibility deriving 
                                                           
35
 Ibid., 16. 
36
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), adopted on 8 June 1977, entry into force: 7 December 1978. 
37
 Roth-Arriaza (1995), 58. 
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from the perpetration of war crimes.38 And as neither the norms of criminal law 
treaties nor the general human rights conventions requiring prosecution prohibit 
by their terms amnesty laws39, it is more the challenge to piece together the expli-
cit and emerging outlines of international rules as they apply and limit the use of 
the concept of amnesty40 as well as to test it against the sources of international 
law.41 
The consideration of piracy and slave trading was so dangerous and devastating 
that any state which caught such offenders was authorised to try and punish them. 
This dates back to the origins of international law, and it has led to the establish-
ment of universal jurisdiction of states over perpetrators of such crimes.42 Univer-
sal jurisdiction, however, is not mandatory, but permissive, meaning only that 
every country is allowed to prosecute criminals regardless of where the conduct in 
question took place, who the victims were, or whether any other link with the 
prosecuting state can be found, and therefore only providing the authority to pros-
ecute and punish43. As such, the concept of universal jurisdiction does not auto-
matically bar the adoption of amnesty laws but it is more that a genuine duty of 
states to prosecute, as opposed to the granting of amnesty, that is required. A duty 
to prosecute arises also in the principle aut dedere aut juducare, meaning that that 
the state where the crime was committed either has to prosecute the perpetrator 
itself or to extradite him. The purpose here is to ensure that those who commit 
                                                           
38
 According to a letter written to interested scholars by an official of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross; Christian Tomuschat, “The Duty to Prosecute International Crimes Committed by Individuals” in: Hans 
Joachim Cremer; Thomas Giegerich; Dagmar Richter; Andreas Zimmermann (eds.), Tradition und Weltoffenheit 
des Rechts: Festschrift für Steinberger, (2002), 348; Naomi Roth-Arriaza and Lauren Gibson, “The Developing 
Jurisprudence on Amnesty”, Human Rights Quarterly, (1998) 20, 865. 
39
 Roth-Arriaza (1995),  57. 
40
 Ibid., 57. 
41
 O’Shea (2004), 33. 
42
 Roth-Arriaza (1995), 25. 
43
 Gerhard Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2005, paras. 171, 183. 
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crimes under international law or perpetrate gross human rights violations are not 
granted safe havens anywhere in the world.44 This principle goes beyond universal 
jurisdiction by making prosecution mandatory and is, in this way, similar to a ge-
nuine duty to prosecute. 
Five different types of provisions provide support for a state’s obligation to inves-
tigate gross human rights violations and to take action against those responsible, 
aside from providing redress to victims: First, there are a series of treaties specify-
ing the obligation of states to prosecute and punish perpetrators of acts defined as 
crimes under international law. Second, authoritative interpretations of broad hu-
man rights treaties hold that state parties fail to ensure and respect the substantive 
rights protecting individuals’ physical integrity if they do not prosecute and pu-
nish perpetrators of gross human rights violations. Third, the so-called “right to a 
remedy” provides a strong basis for inferring a duty to prosecute45. And forth and 
fifth, there is customary international law as well as general principles of law 
leading to the said obligation. 
A distinction is drawn between a duty to prosecute, obliging, primarily, the state 
of commission, and, secondarily, third states. As to the duty of the state of com-
mission in regard to the concept of amnesty, the question arises to what extent the 
duty exists and whether it is deragable or not. Concerning third states, the ques-
tion is more whether an amnesty adopted by the state of commission would bar 
the third states’ jurisdiction. 
 
 
                                                           
44
 Roth-Arriaza (1995), 25. 
45
 Ibid., 24. 
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1) Duty to Prosecute Arising from Criminal Law Treaties 
The oldest obligation for states to prosecute certain crimes arises from the 1949 
Geneva Conventions46. Protocol I to the Conventions47 states that “in order to 
avoid any doubt concerning the prosecution and trial of persons accused of war 
crimes or crimes against humanity, these persons should be submitted for the pur-
pose of prosecution in accordance with international law, subject to guarantees of 
a fair trial”.48 Moreover, in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide of 194849 and the Convention on the Suppression and Pu-
nishment of the Crime of Apartheid of 197350, the contracting parties confirm that 
genocide and apartheid are crimes under international law, which they undertake 
to prevent as well as to bring to trial those persons found within their jurisdiction 
accused of, or responsible for, the crime of genocide, apartheid, respectively.51 
Additionally, the Convention against Torture of 198452, as well as the Inter-
American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons of 199453 require 
prosecution or extradition (aut dedere aut judicare) of suspected offenders of the 
crimes of concern.54 And finally, a series of treaties on slavery and slavelike prac-
tices, including forced labour, as well as international agreements to outlaw and 
punish hijacking, aircraft sabotage, the taking of hostages, and terrorism all in-
                                                           
46
 “grave breaches” under these Conventions include willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including 
biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body and health, unlawful deporta-
tion or transfer or unlawful confinement. 
47
 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted on 8 June 1977. 
48
 Roth-Arriaza (1995), 25. 
49
 Article I, II, IV and V of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted 
on 9 December 1948, entry into force: 12 January 1951. 
50
 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, adopted on 30 No-
vember 1973, entry into force: 18 July 1976. 
51
 Roth-Arriaza (1995), 25, 26. 
52
 United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, adopted on 10 December 1984, entry into force: 26 June 1987. 
53
 Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearances of Persons, adopted on 9 June 1994, entry into force: 
28 March 1996. 
54
 Roth-Arriaza (1995), 26, 27. 
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clude provisions which also require extradition or prosecution of those impli-
cated.55 All these crimes both inherently threaten human life and create a threat to 
international peace, commerce, and stability, and the conventions prohibiting 
them represent the movement from permissive universal jurisdiction to mandatory 
action against the modern-day successors to the pirates of old.56 
The most recent development is the adoption of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court57, stating in its Preamble58 that it is the duty of every state to exer-
cise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes, name-
ly, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes59. 
Nonetheless, it is important to bear in mind that the applicability of criminal law 
treaties is limited because not all states signed the relevant treaties, nor have all 
states ratified them, or domesticated them. 
2) Duty to Prosecute Arising from Human Rights Treaties / the “Right to a 
Remedy”, Respectively 
After the shocking crimes committed immediately before and during World War 
II states finally began to accept limits on their virtually absolute sovereignty re-
garding the human rights of those residing within their jurisdiction.60 Since then, 
comprehensive multilateral human rights instruments have been established61. The 
authoritative bodies interpreting these treaties and monitoring their enforcement 
                                                           
55
 Ibid., 25. 
56
 Ibid., 26. 
57
 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted on 17 July 1998, entry into force: 1 July 2002. 
58
 Para. 4 to 6 of the Preamble. 
59
 Articles 6, 7, and 8 ICC Statute. 
60
 Roth-Arriaza (1995), 24. 
61
 For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted on 16 December 1966, entry 
into force: 23 March 1976; the American Convention on Human Rights, adopted on 22 November 1969, entry 
into force: 18 July 1978; the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted on 4 
November 1950, entry into force: 3 September 1953. 
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have required states to investigate, prosecute, and compensate victims in cases of 
torture, summary execution, and disappearances.62 It began in 1988 with the Ve-
lazquez-Rodriguez63 case in which the Inter American Court of Human Rights 
decided that a state has a legal duty to prevent human rights violations, investigate 
evidence of such violations, identify those responsible, impose suitable penalties 
and ensure proper restitution to the victims.64 
The question arises whether it is one thing to declare that general human rights 
must be protected, if need be, by criminal law, but quite another thing to posit that 
in each and every case where a violation has occurred the perpetrator must be pu-
nished.65 However, the jurisprudential development shows clearly that since the 
competent international tribunals (the European Court of Human Rights66 / the 
UN Human Rights Committee67) have also embraced the view that in instances of 
grave attacks against life, physical integrity and freedom of the victims, the duty 
to protect and ensure human rights entails a duty to punish the responsible perpe-
trators, this proposition seems by now to have acquired sufficiently broad founda-
tions to stand as a rule of applicable positive law68. 
It certainly would be exaggerated to say that any human rights violation must nec-
essarily entail criminal prosecution in order to undo the injury suffered by the vic-
tim. And what needs to be said here is that the principle of proportionality must be 
respected in this regard.69 Nevertheless, the jurisprudence of the above-mentioned 
                                                           
62
 Roth-Arriaza (1995), 28. 
63
 Velazquez Rodriguez, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, judgment of 29 July 1988, Series C No. 4. 
64
 Werle (2005), para. 181; see also, for example: Barrios Altos vs. Peru Case (14 March 2001) Judgment, Series 
C No. 75 (Inter-American Court of Human Rights); Almonacid-Arellano et al v. Chile, (26 September 2006) 
Judgment Series C No. 154 (Inter-American Court of Human Rights). 
65
 Tomuschat (2002), 320; Ambos (2007), 16. 
66
 Tomuschat (2002), 320. 
67
 Ibid., 322, 323. 
68
 Ibid., 325. 
69
 Ibid., 321. 
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human rights courts now seems to be firmly settled,70 and a duty to prosecute also 
follows from the duty of states to guarantee human rights and ensure effective 
legal protection71. 
All the comprehensive human rights treaties include in some form the “right to a 
remedy” for violations72, meaning that there is an obligation to “ensure” rights73. 
Here again the question arises whether such a “remedy” can only be provided by 
the means of criminal law. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has 
long interpreted the “right to a remedy” language in the American Convention to 
include the obligation to investigate and prosecute, calling repeatedly for investi-
gation of the facts and punishment of the responsible individuals in cases of tor-
ture or disappearances. The European Court of Human Rights has also interpreted 
the “right to remedy” language of the European Convention in the same way74. In 
the Klass75 case, for example, the Court found that Article 13 of the Convention 
requires the state to ensure that there is a remedy before a national authority in 
order both to have the petitioner’s claim of a violation of the Convention decided 
and, if appropriate, to ensure that he obtains redress. Additionally, in the case X 
and Y v the Netherlands76 the Court held that only criminal law provisions could 
achieve effective deterrence and would normally regulate such matters. The Court 
held that, for serious criminal law violations, at least the possibility of prosecution 
                                                           
70
 Ibid., 323. 
71
 Angelika Schlunck, Amnesty versus Accountability, Berlin: Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz GmbH, 2000, 39. 
72
 Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted and proclaimed on 10 December 1948); 
Article 2 (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Article 25 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights. 
73
 Roth-Arriaza (1995), 32. 
74
 Ibid., 34. 
75
 Klass and others v. Germany (application no. 5029/71) Judgment of 6 September 1978 (ECHR). 
76
 X and Y v. the Netherlands (application no. 8978/80) Judgment of 26 March 1985 (ECHR). 
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may be a requirement under the European Convention when civil remedies may 
be insufficient.77 
As mentioned in the context of criminal law treaties, it is important to keep in 
mind that not all countries are parties to one or more of the human rights instru-
ments described here, and that these treaty-based obligations do not apply to them. 
In particular, governments that systematically violate human rights may be disin-
clined to adhere to human rights treaty regimes. However, these countries are still 
bound to respect the obligation to investigate and prosecute human rights violators 
if the obligation has attained the status of a customary law norm or a general prin-
ciple of law.78 
3) Duty to Prosecute Arising from Customary International Law or General 
Principles of Law 
Although obligations to investigate, prosecute, and to provide redress are relative-
ly clear under treaty law, their customary law status turns out to be more ambi-
guous. A number of sources, like the treaty provisions mentioned above, taken 
together, diplomatic practice or the customary law surrounding crimes against 
humanity, if combined, suggest an emerging obligation under customary law.79 
Nonetheless, the failure of many states to act even against notorious human rights 
violators, or the granting of amnesties absolving violators from responsibility, 
makes it more difficult to define the fine line between the flouting of an estab-
lished norm and the non-existence of sufficient evidence, based on internal prac-
tice, of the existence of the norm itself.80 Nevertheless, the clearest place where a 
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treaty obligation may have transmuted into customary law are the aut dedere aut 
judicare provisions common to treaties that criminalise human rights violations 
like torture and forced disappearances. The list of treaties requiring either prose-
cution or extradition is as long as the crimes they deal with, and these include hu-
manitarian law, genocide, apartheid, slavery, prostitution, piracy, hijacking, drug 
trafficking, and terrorism.81 Yet, the most important point in this context is that 
under customary international law it is recognised today that the state in which a 
crime under international law (genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes) 
is committed has a duty to prosecute that crime.82 
Given the fact that major legal systems all contain the idea that criminal conduct, 
even when (or especially when) perpetrated by state agents or officials, should be 
punished by the state,83 one could say that a duty to prosecute international crimes 
or gross violations of human rights also results from these general principles of 
law recognized by civilized nations as a supplementary source of international 
law. 
4) Preliminary Result 
In sum, a duty to prosecute crimes under international law arises from several 
criminal law treaties, human rights treaties, customary international law, and even 
the general principles of law. Overall, the trends with respect to international 
criminal law show a movement from permissive to mandatory jurisdiction and 
from the idea of an international tribunal to reliance on national legal systems to 
prosecute offenders84, just as is perfectly illustrated by the establishment of the 
                                                           
81
 Ibid., 41. 
82
 Schlunck (2000), 27. 
83
 Roth-Arriaza (1995), 48. 
84
 Ibid., 25, 28. 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
International Criminal Court. The logic underlying international crimes is that 
they affect the interests of the international community as a whole85. And this 
would seem to deny individual states the power to grant amnesties on their own 
initiative, without any co-ordination with the other states or international institu-
tions.86 
As regards the distinction between the duty to prosecute of the state of commis-
sion, on the one hand, and third states, on the other, it follows that if the former 
has a duty to prosecute it loses the power to grant an amnesty, and if it does do so, 
then the possibilities of third states to prosecute the perpetrators within their juris-
diction is not barred. In turn, in cases where there is no duty to prosecute on the 
part of the state of commission and instead amnesty laws are adopted or an “ad-
missible” amnesty is granted, third states would have to respect the amnesty, too, 
and refrain from prosecution within their jurisdictions.  
Against the background of this established duty of states to prosecute international 
crimes, on the one hand, and the growing practice of states of adopting amnesty 
laws, on the other, it appears questionable and problematic how to integrate the 
concept of amnesty into international criminal law generally. 
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IV. Derogability of the Duty to Prosecute and General Pros and Cons of Am-
nesty 
It is certain that a national amnesty cannot be condemned as being unlawful where 
international law refrains from setting forth a duty of criminal prosecution.87 
However, as shown above, when it comes to international crimes and gross viola-
tions of human rights the duty of states to prosecute is nearly all-encompassing.  
In order to establish whether amnesties can be in line with international (criminal) 
law, the question to answer is whether the duty to prosecute, to the extent that it 
exists, applies rigorously under all possible circumstances, with no exception, or 
whether it leaves some leeway for states to exercise political discretion according 
to requirements of political expediency88. Put differently, the question arises 
whether the duty to prosecute is (non-) derogable89.  
This question becomes all the more acute when a country has emerged from the 
yoke of dictatorship and a fresh equilibrium needs to be found within a new and 
democratic context to come to grips with the past.90 And considering the fact that 
in many countries, where the transition to the rule of law and democracy was not 
the outcome of a victory of revolutionary forces, but rather the result of a com-
promise between the opponents91, there was always a temptation for the groups 
still in power, as well as their challengers, to protect themselves from any danger 
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of one day suffering criminal sanctions by adopting amnesty laws as the most 
convenient instrument for that purpose.92 
On the one hand, disappearances, arbitrary killings, torture and “ethnic cleansing” 
all call for a resolute response from the new leadership93, but on the other hand, 
there may also be interests which indeed can be pursued best by granting an am-
nesty to perpetrators of such crimes. 
It is exactly these phases of transition which are the subject of the study of transi-
tional justice, which can be defined as the body of law that guides us through the 
question of how new governments deal with a new developing democracy and 
post human rights violations or how they reconstruct the social and moral fibre of 
a society whilst dealing with the legacies of the past94. 
1) Arguments contra Amnesty 
Granting amnesty to perpetrators of international crimes or gross violations of 
human rights matches a converse of the state’s obligation to prosecute.95 In clear-
ing the way to impunity the adoption of amnesties threatens peace and democra-
cy96, since, regardless of whether the country concerned finds itself in a transi-
tional process or not, the first and most important step to be taken by a govern-
ment is necessarily the establishment and promotion of the rule of law97, including 
the state’s obligations arising from international criminal law. Otherwise, the po-
tentially counter-productive nature of amnesty, deriving from the negative effects 
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of impunity, comes into effect and the non-enforcement of criminal law leads to 
the immolation of its authority as well as its power to deter future crimes.98 This 
perceived authority of the law must not be sacrificed in favour of such abstract 
interests like peace and stability,99 and this especially holding for international 
criminal law being not as settled as national criminal law, but still emerging and 
in a developing process claiming invariable validity and trying to establish and 
maintain its authority globally by ensuring that it cannot be ousted domestical-
ly100. 
Respect for the law generally is likely to be compromised where it might widely 
be known that certain crimes, no matter how heinous, can be perpetuated with 
relative impunity.101 Regarding international crimes, which affect the interests of 
the international community as a whole, another logical line of reasoning argues 
against the concept of amnesty. Does not the perpetration of such crimes require 
punishment, if not for other reasons but only to ensure the protection of this inter-
national community’s interests within a state’s own borders and to avoid encour-
aging future atrocities in other unstable areas of the world102 and establishing a 
“negative” precedent to the peoples of other countries?  
Moreover, amnesty is often ill-reputed as simply reflecting the weakness of the 
machinery entrusted with upholding the rule of law, on the one hand, and the pre-
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ponderant role of the military, on the other (“auctoritas, non veritas facit le-
gem”).103  
Proponents of investigation argue that a society which moves forward without 
confronting its past is condemned to repeat it and that only investigations and 
prosecutions draw a clear line between past and future, allowing the beginning of 
a healing process for the victims and especially their families to put past to rest.104 
They argue that a culture of impunity will continue unless the cycle is broken.105 
Furthermore, they contend that prosecutions represent an efficient way of ascer-
taining the truth through the legal process, ensuring that fact finding will be tho-
rough and reasonably impartial. In addition, punishment, at least stigmatising the 
guilty, will also serve to deter potential lawbreakers.106 
Psychologists have long noted the traumatic effects of victimization.107 They point 
out that prosecutions can channel the desire for private vengeance while “restoring 
citizens to full membership in society by suppressing the differences between 
those who had control over other persons’ lives and those whose existence was at 
their mercy”108. 
Perhaps the strongest argument against the concept of amnesty is that general de-
terrence requires the certainty of punishment109 and in the absence of deterrence 
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and reformation, punishing the perpetrators of atrocities diminishes the need for 
reprisals or vengeance from the other parties to the conflict.110 
All these arguments result in the conclusion that prosecution and punishment of 
international crimes or gross violations of human rights promote best peace 
through a respect for the authority of the law111, placing a ban on the concept of 
amnesty entirely. 
An example for the application of such a “strict prosecution” approach can be 
found in the case of Rwanda, where a substantial part of the population was party 
to the most horrific of all crimes, that of genocide, against a million of its citizens, 
and although considerations in the direction of adopting amnesty laws could have 
been made, the government yet opted for punishment due to the country’s history 
of impunity which could not endure an amnesty.112 
2) Arguments pro Amnesty 
There are also good reasons and arguments not to prosecute and punish but to 
install amnesties instead. They are usually linked close to some kind of transition-
al phases of states. The arguments here are that states should be able to exempt 
themselves from the obligations to prosecute and should be able to justify amnesty 
as a permissible derogation from existing international commitments. These ar-
guments can be grouped into “legal”, “political” and “practical experience” argu-
ments.  
 
 
                                                           
110
 O’Shea (2004), 81. 
111
 Ibid., 84. 
112
 Ibid., 37. 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
a) Legal Arguments 
Within the international legal context, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights113 and both the European114 and American115 conventions on hu-
man rights all contain provisions permitting derogation from some human rights 
obligations under conditions of a so-called “public emergency”. Fragile incoming 
governments facing a hostile military or continued ethnic or factional strife, for 
example, could plausibly argue for applicability of this “public emergency” es-
cape clause.116 The European Court of Human Rights once defined the term of 
“public emergency” as a situation where the danger must be actual or imminent, 
its effects involving the whole nation, and threatening the continuance of the or-
ganized life of the community117 and held that “the crisis or danger must be ex-
ceptional, in that the normal measures or restrictions permitted by the Convention 
for the maintenance of public safety, health and order, are plainly inadequate”118. 
Furthermore, international criminal law treaties contain their own derogability 
provisions, for instance, the Convention Against Torture, which makes the prohi-
bition on torture non-derogable under any circumstances but not so the obligation 
to investigate and prosecute.119 
Although these “public emergency” exceptions are limited and certain basic 
rights, including the right to life and those judicial guarantees essential for the 
protection of non-derogable rights120 are non-derogable themselves, they show 
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that a duty to prosecute arising from human rights treaties in principle and in the 
end can be porous. Of course, amnesty is not allowed for violations of non-
derogable rights, but concerning violations of derogable rights there is some lee-
way left.  
The same applies to the duty to prosecute within the scope of customary interna-
tional law where the customary “doctrine of necessity” is in effect and can provide 
a defence to avoid obligations of customary law.121 Here again, a state must be 
threatened by a grave and imminent danger and its sole means of safeguarding an 
essential interest must be to adopt conduct not in conformity with international 
requirements while the state itself must not have contributed to creating the condi-
tion of necessity.122 
Consequently, international law does not forbid the concept of amnesty categori-
cally as long as a “very special and extreme” situation arises of which the exis-
tence to show is a very heavy burden. 
Moreover, noticeable123 state practice shows that in transitional phases states do 
use amnesties for the purpose of forgetting about the past and starting anew, and 
they do so with strong societal support and tolerance of the international commu-
nity and international law. Amnesties have been most prominent in the African 
and Latin-American regions, maybe because of the fact that these two regions 
have suffered a greater share of the world’s civil strife and dictatorships and have 
also been the showcases for modern transitions to peace and democracy.124 
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O’Shea also states that amnesties, as a price for peace in societies in transition, 
will not go away.125 In the context of state practice concerning amnesties, it is 
important to note that state practice itself plays a role within customary interna-
tional law, providing one of two aspects which compose this source of law and 
even though there might be no opinio iuris concerning the acceptance of amnes-
ties, at least a state practice on this matter can be found. Therefore, the amnesty 
state practice gives rise to considerations that amnesties might be permitted as 
exceptional measures and, consequently, on the question under which circums-
tances this should be the case.  
Another argument in favour of amnesties can be drawn from the attempt to rank 
the “legal aims” of peace, which amnesties try to achieve, and justice. Would it be 
possible to establish a hierarchy of these two ideals? On the one hand, one needs 
justice to achieve peace, but, on the other hand, even justice needs to be pursued 
within the context of its associated goal of lasting peace.126 Accordingly, as the 
pursuit of justice entails the prolongation of hostilities, whereas the pursuit of 
peace requires resigning oneself to some injustices127, it must be possible to use 
amnesties with the purpose to establish and maintain peace and sacrifice justice to 
some extent in extreme cases.  
It is interesting that even the United Nations have taken part in peace negotiations 
with an amnesty on the table (for instance, in El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti or 
Sierra Leone), thus giving amnesties some kind of international legitimacy.128 
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b) Political Arguments 
It is essential to understand the multi-dimensional framework within which choic-
es to prosecute or amnesty operate129, and the proposition that law is never made 
in a vacuum but is always part of a larger political, moral, and social dynamic,130 
as well as a factual context,131 especially holds true when it comes to the idea of 
transitional justice, which in itself requires a contextual inquiry132. Therefore, 
dealing with a criminal past is a challenge requiring differentiated solutions 
which, in addition to legal considerations, also demand a good political judgment 
within a large margin of discretion.133 Political considerations in the end are the 
most important for a civil society as it is certain that if life and limb are not safe, 
such a society falls apart134.  
Putting it in simple terms, it can be said that there are two basic arguments justify-
ing amnesties, the first being the attempt to achieve reconciliation, and the second 
being the preservation of lasting peace.135 
These various justifications have been employed individually and in conjunction 
with each other, intertwining into one coherent objective of effecting lasting 
peaceful coexistence of human kind. With regard to amnesties, the underlying 
assumption is that in a particular context, they might be a more appropriate means 
of achieving this goal than punishment. 136 
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aa) Reconciliation 
Reconciliation can be understood as a process of making friends again or re-
instituting alliances after estrangement, as a gesture of atonement for past wrongs 
as well as a catalyst for lasting peace.137 Amnesty, however, has a different, more 
modest reconciliatory function. It aims not so much at to create friendly relations, 
but more to do away with enmity resulting from previous hostilities. Governments 
that grant amnesty to rebels or agree to amnesty in peace treaties usually have no 
desire to form alliances with former foes, but merely wish to diminish or extin-
guish the hostility that feeds the desire for war. 138 Balancing the possibilities, ei-
ther to prosecute or to grant amnesty, it may be thought that far-reaching amnes-
ties may serve as the most suitable and effective tool for achieving such a recon-
ciliation139. Opponents of official investigations have argued that such investiga-
tions may do more harm than good140, because by dwelling on the past, they ar-
gue, a deeply divided society will be unable to overcome its divisions and move 
forward and old hatreds and vengeances will be dredged up and replayed ad infi-
nitum, yet the overriding need is to let bygones be bygones and move forward in a 
spirit of conciliation.141 
bb) Peace 
Even where amnesty was not politically an absolute necessity, it has been used to 
ensure lasting peace, this being the main underlying rationale of amnesty clauses 
in peace treaties.142 It has long been recognised that lasting peace can only be 
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achieved by quelling the need for vengeance and that wars, ended by compromise 
and forgiveness, may be said to foster peace more effectively than those followed 
by recounting scores and revenge.143 In facilitating transition, it is often expedient 
to obtain the co-operation of the key figures in the predecessor regime, and am-
nesty provides an incentive to such role players to co-operate with each other.144 
If perpetrators of international crimes were the only ones to sign a peace treaty, 
should they really be prevented from doing so by the threat of being prosecuted as 
soon as caught? 145 Granting amnesty to these perpetrators has two decisive advan-
tages to the new government. Along with the fact that the combating parties can 
be brought around one table, the party which grants amnesty has the advantage to 
lay down the conditions for the next steps. In other words, the ball then is in the 
new government’s court. If those conditions involve crushing the dignity of the 
vanquished by strict prosecution the peace will not last146, but with amnesty a 
fresh start under the leadership of the new government is possible. This constella-
tion arguing pro the concept of amnesty appeared so advantageous to the author 
that this work is prefaced with an introductory statement illustrating this point. 
As, in most cases, the individual concerned would in any event be unlikely to re-
offend against international norms after the relevant political situation forming the 
background to the crimes had subsided, it follows that it is this political situation 
which is to clear first and foremost to prevent future atrocities147  and there is not 
necessarily a need for prosecutions of all perpetrators to achieve this goal.  
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Eventually, considering amnesty as a necessary evil to ensure transition to democ-
racy148, establishing peace by the means of granting an amnesty is all a matter of 
give and take. 
c) Practical Experience Arguments 
What speaks for the concept of amnesty in very simple way is the fact that some-
times, after conflicts involving masses of victims and perpetrators, it might be 
practically impossible to bring all the latter to justice.  
The reason for that might be, for example, the limited resources that are available 
to a state, especially when the state is going through transition or change in gov-
ernment. These limited resources would have to be carefully managed to meet 
various needs. They might not be adequate to fund protracted and expensive trials, 
the outcome of which might not even result in a conviction or the establishing the 
truth. The Magnus Malan trial in South Africa is a case in point.149 The case of 
Rwanda after the genocide can serve as another example in this context and one 
could ask whether the decision of the government to try all alleged persons and 
now being stuck with full courts with a mass of never-ending cases – only because 
the country’s history of impunity could not endure an amnesty150 – was right.  
Furthermore, evidence may be destroyed or stale151, the witnesses reluctant and 
especially in most cases of transition from totalitarian or authoritarian regimes, the 
judiciary was very much part of the old system, implementing the repressive poli-
                                                           
148
 Susan Opotow, “Psychology of Impunity and Injustice: Implications for Social Reconstruction” in: M. Cherif 
Bassiouni and Dean C. Alexander (eds.), Post-Conflict Justice, (2002), 210; O’Shea (2004), 24. 
149
 O’Shea (2004), 100. 
150
 Ibid., 37.  
151
 Roth-Arriaza (1995), 9. 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
cies and wrapping them in the mantle of the rule of law,152 thus preserving the old 
order.153 
Would it in not be wiser in such cases to allow an amnesty as a formal and defined 
measure of exception and a realistic solution, rather than to establish a state of 
factual “quite” impunity?  
d) Preliminary Result 
As Tomuschat notes perfectly, one must recall that human rights and international 
criminal responsibility were invented to protect people who are threatened within 
a domestic context but not to constrain a national community which succeeds on 
its own initiative to repair the injuries of the past in the own way of self-
determination.154 
Respecting all these arguments in favour of amnesty, it is to agree with those who 
are of the view that amnesties, if they have been responsibly granted by a people 
wishing to make a fresh start after having lived through a period of national cata-
clysm, should also be respected by the international law and the international 
community.155 Thus, in special situations amnesties combined with other ways 
and means of confronting the past should be admissible to restore domestic peace 
and make national reconciliation possible.156  
 
 
                                                           
152
 Neil Kritz, “The Dilemmas of Transitional Justice” in: Neil Kritz (ed.) Transitional Justice: How Emerging De-
mocracies Recon with Former Regimes, (1995) 1, xxv et seq. 
153
 O’Shea (2004), 32. 
154
 Tomuschat (2002), 347. 
155
 John Dugard, “Dealing with Crimes of a Past Regime. Is Amnesty Still an Option?”, Leiden Journal of Interna-
tional Law, (1999) 12, 1009. 
156
 Werle (2005), para. 190. 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
V. Which Kind of Amnesty is Acceptable? 
Ultimately, let us move to the considerations on which amnesties are acceptable 
and under which circumstances. While the duty to prosecute would almost logi-
cally lead to a prohibition of amnesties the broad concept of justice applicable in 
transitional justice calls for a more sophisticated approach.157 
First, one has to distinguish between the so-called “strict approach” and the “flex-
ible approach”158 characterising the bifurcated approach under which blanket am-
nesties are generally unacceptable and conditional amnesties acceptable in prin-
ciple. 
1) Blanket, General and Self Protecting Amnesties 
As regards only blanket, general and self-protecting amnesties, these are generally 
unacceptable (strict approach). International law unequivocally prohibits this kind 
of amnesties159, and the vast body of legal literature overwhelmingly confirms this 
position160. 
The problem is that their primary goal is to conceal completely past crimes by 
prohibiting any investigation161, and this goal backs up none of the positive aims 
of the concept of amnesty, namely, peace or reconciliation. 
The sovereignty argument of the French Conseil Constitutionelle162, that the effec-
tive exercise of sovereignty entails the right to take a sovereign decision on am-
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nesty, cannot be convincing, since it does not respect international obligations of 
the state and the international nature of crimes under international law.  
Blanket, general and self-protecting amnesties lead to the defenselessness of vic-
tims and perpetuate impunity; they preclude the identification of the perpetrators 
by obstructing the investigation and access to justice; they prevent the victims and 
their relatives from knowing the truth and receiving the appropriate reparation163; 
they are inconsistent with general principles of law forbidding self-judging164; and 
therefore, besides the positive effect that they permit a military regime to abandon 
its grip over the state, they are to be regarded with a high degree of mistrust.165 
Examples of such unacceptable amnesties can be found in Chile (1978), El Sava-
dor (1993), Peru (1995) and Sierra Leone (1999), where the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone in the famous case Kallon and Kamara has considered the amnesty 
as without effect since it is, inter alia, “contrary to the direction in which custo-
mary international law is developing and (…) to the obligations in certain treaties 
and conventions the purpose of which is to protect humanity”166. 
2) Conditional Amnesties 
On the other hand, conditional amnesties are, in principle, acceptable (flexible 
approach), since they do not automatically exempt perpetrators from punishment 
but make the exemption conditional on certain acts or concessions by the benefit-
ing persons.167 They incorporate the idea that an amnesty alone does not satisfy 
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the demands of true reconciliation and therefore must be accompanied by alterna-
tive mechanisms allowing for the full and public establishment of the truth and the 
acknowledgement of those responsible for their criminal acts.168 This leads to the 
crucial matter of what conditions should be postulated when it comes to accepta-
ble conditional amnesties. 
The first and minimum condition is the armed group’s unreserved promise to lay 
down their arms, thus facilitating the end of hostilities.169 In addition, restitution, 
reparation/compensation for and rehabilitation of the victims, as well as non-
repetition assurances are required. Lustration laws are other important transitional 
justice tools. In special cases other traditional justice mechanisms, for example, 
“Gacaca” courts in Rwanda can be applied. Most probably, a combined applica-
tion of all the transitional justice tools is appropriate, given the fact that the meas-
ures are complementary, each playing a distinctly important role.170 
The most important condition is a full disclosure of the facts and acknowledge-
ment of responsibility.171 This condition is best dealt with by the establishment of 
a so-called Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). 
A TRC is defined and described as “an official, temporary, non-judicial fact find-
ing body that investigates a pattern of abuses of human rights or humanitarian law 
committed over a number of years. This body takes a victim-centred approach and 
concludes its work with a final report of findings of facts and recommendations. 
(…) Truth commissions have the potential to be of great benefit in helping post-
conflict societies establish the facts about past human rights violations, foster ac-
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countability, preserve evidence, identify perpetrators and recommend reparations 
and institutional reforms. They can also provide a public platform for victims to 
address the nation directly with their personal stories and can facilitate public de-
bate about how to come to terms with the past”172. The broader the participation in 
a TRC and the more democratic and transparent this process has been, the more 
legitimacy will the amnesty enjoy.173 
Of course, TRCs depend on the main political actors and their willingness and co-
operation.174 If the entire society co-operates they can be an effective means of 
establishing a “global truth”, which goes beyond the mere judicial truth thereby 
contributing to national reconciliation and constituting an integral part of a socie-
ty’s restoration process.175   
It is important that TRCs are separate institutions, created formally by law, rather 
than established through executive policy.176 Additionally, the commissioners 
who are appointed should be “perceived as above politics”177, so that they are not 
viewed as biased.  Finally, the mandate of TRCs should be broad enough to pro-
vide a complete picture of the past.178 
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In this sense, a TRC may claim international recognition, especially vis-à-vis the 
international criminal justice system. 
The counter-example to the Rwandan case and the most famous example of a 
conditional amnesty process is found in the law that established South Africa’s 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)179.  According to this Act an indi-
vidual amnesty could be granted upon application to a specific Amnesty Commit-
tee within a framework of a trial-like procedure, exposing the applicant to public 
scrutiny.180 The conditions were that the applicant fully discloses all committed 
acts and that these acts could be considered political offences. The amnesty provi-
sions have been approved by the South African Constitutional Court181, arguing 
that the chosen approach was necessary in order to cross the “historic bridge” on 
the way to national reconciliation and unity.  This decision was controversial but 
it can be considered as the most important decision of a court on amnesty in tran-
sitional phases and the South African model is recognized as a relatively success-
ful one182. 
The reasons why such conditional amnesties have to be respected are that they can 
be an expression of a nation’s self-determination and lead to peace and reconcilia-
tion in situations where prosecutions would not. 
In summary, acceptable amnesties should have democratic legitimacy (“expres-
sion of a free will”183). They should promote a genuine desire to promote peace 
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and reconciliation, should be limited in scope and conditional, and they must be 
accompanied by reparations.184 
Concerning the latter point, it is submitted that it should be common sense that an 
amnesty from civil liability should never be acceptable, as civil actions are fo-
cused on repairing the damage to the aggrieved party rather than inflicting suffer-
ing on the person who caused the loss, meaning that the objective is the compen-
sation of the victim which always should be imperative to eliminate as fully as 
possible the victim’s past as well as future material damage.185 Maybe this is the 
point where, in my opinion, the decision of the South African Constitutional Court 
in the AZAPO case can be criticized most. 
Respecting these arguments is only possible if the justice element in transitional 
justice is understood broadly186 as an ideal of accountability and fairness in the 
protection and vindication of rights and the prevention and punishment of wrongs. 
This implies that one has to have regard for the rights of the accused, for the inter-
ests of victims, and the well-being of society at large,187  the aim being to restore 
or even reconstruct such a society (in the sense of “creative justice”).188 
 
VI. Amnesty and the International Criminal Court 
The increasing importance of the ICC, which represents a negotiated expression 
of the views of the international community on the priorities for global justice,189 
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makes it inevitable to examine its law with regard to peace processes and amnes-
ties.  
The amnesty issue, as well as the issue of alternative accountability measures,190 
was not specifically addressed in the ICC Statute, but was left to the Court. The 
ICC Statute has a limiting effect on national amnesties in principle insofar as the 
States Parties are obliged to co-operate with the Court, for instance, by surrender-
ing a person who is protected by a national unconditional amnesty. This follows 
from the international law principle that a state may not rely on its municipal law 
as an excuse for not complying with its international obligation.191 Consequently, 
domestic unconditional amnesties cannot bar the ICC’s jurisdiction. 
 However, the ICC Statute, as a flexible instrument, and the ICC as a flexible ac-
countability mechanism,192 do have possibilities to deal and even respect condi-
tional amnesties. This follows, on the one hand, from the ICC prosecutor’s rela-
tively broad discretion with regard to the preliminary investigation and the taking 
of certain investigative measures and, on the other, from the provisions in Articles 
16, 17 and 53 of the ICC Statute, which can be interpreted as an indirect recogni-
tion of measures refraining from criminal prosecution for the sake of a peaceful 
transition or the achievement of peace.193 Indeed, it appears inconceivable that the 
ICC pretends to substitute a judgment of a whole nation that seeks peace and jus-
tice by other means than strict prosecution194. 
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Article 17, for a number of authors the “most delicate” provision of the ICC Sta-
tute in the context of transitional justice195, organizes the relationship between the 
ICC and domestic jurisdictions, trying to find an adequate balance between the 
states’ sovereign exercise of criminal jurisdiction and the international communi-
ty’s interest in preventing impunity for international core crimes. It follows from 
this provision that the ICC only acts when States are either unwilling to prosecute 
or are unable to do so.196 When it comes to amnesty the applicable provisions are 
subparas. (a) and (b) of Art. 17 (1). According to these provisions, if a state “in its 
sovereign wisdom”197 decides to grant amnesty and not to investigate and/or pros-
ecute, Art. 17 (1) (b) applies. Three conditions must be fulfilled to make the ICC’s 
intervention inadmissible: the respective state must have “investigated” the case; 
it must have taken the decision “not to prosecute”; and this decision must not re-
sult from unwillingness and inability.198 
A conditional amnesty coupled with the creation of a TRC, and having the pur-
pose to achieve peace and reconciliation can fulfill these requirements. Just be-
cause a state grants an amnesty does not mean that the state is unwilling to prose-
cute, because the amnesty can also be granted in “good faith”199. This is especially 
so when we analyse the term “genuinely” (Article 17 (1) (a), (b)), which was in-
serted to give the unwillingness/inability test a more concrete and objective mean-
ing.200 It is taken to imply good faith and seriousness on the part of the state con-
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cerned with regard to investigation and prosecution. Therefore, it would be diffi-
cult to argue that a state which opts for an effective TRC with the ultimate goal of 
peace in mind is “genuinely” unwilling to investigate and/or prosecute. In the end, 
the admissibility of the case before the ICC depends on the specific content and 
conditions of the amnesty201 and in sum, one may conclude that a conditional am-
nesty with a TRC results in inadmissibility, but only if an effective TRC grants an 
amnesty on an individual basis under certain strict conditions as listed above.202 
Article 16 of the ICC Statute allows the UN Security Council to hold an investiga-
tion or prosecution on the basis of a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Char-
ter. For example, this provision kicks in to prevent a situation identified as a threat 
to or breach of the peace (Articles 39 and 40 UN Charter). Thus, the Council is 
able, by such a decision, to even lend international validity to a national peace 
process with an amnesty.203 The weakness of this norm in regard to amnesties is, 
on the one hand, that such a decision of the UN Security Council can only be va-
lid for a limited period of time, and on the other, that the International Criminal 
Court, being an independent international institution and deciding autonomously 
about its jurisdiction204, has to power to indirectly review the Security Council’s 
decision.205 
Finally, the most explicit gateway of the ICC Statute for the recognition of alter-
native processes of national reconciliation, including the granting of an amnesty, 
is the interest of justice clause in Article 53 (1) (c) and (2) (c).206 By this “politi-
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cal” provision the drafters of the ICC Statute wanted to give the ICC’s prosecutor 
an additional instrument to exercise a discretion, going beyond the rather “tech-
nical”207 Article 17. There is no other clause in the ICC Statute allowing so expli-
citly for policy considerations208. The notion of “justice” in Article 53 ICC Statute 
is a characteristically broad one,209 and allows for the consideration of complex 
transitional justice problems. 
These three provisions show that, although the ICC is primarily a criminal court 
concerned with individual responsibility and not with issues of peace and securi-
ty,210 it must be, and is, “part of the transitional justice project”211. 
 
VII. Selective Prosecution Approach as a Proposal 
As elements of necessity push transitional societies into adopting quickly-devised 
mechanisms for facilitating democratic transition and national peace,212 in my 
opinion, in countries undergoing transition it would be best to combine a condi-
tional amnesty for lower-level offenders with selective prosecutions of the “most 
responsible”213. This approach has the benefit that efforts to establish peace can be 
reconciled with those efforts to achieve justice, just as this is the main goal of 
transitional justice214. Those who perpetrated the worst crimes must be prosecut-
ed, while those who cannot be qualified as “main perpetrators” escape prosecution 
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and can take part in building the future instead. If the validity of international 
criminal law depends on the affirmation of its authority through punishment215 
that does not necessarily mean that it is required to prosecute every perpetrator, as 
this would not be a realistic obligation.216 It can suffice that only the most respon-
sible perpetrators are brought to justice. 
Consequently, the most important question in this context would be how to distin-
guish main perpetrators from those who should not be regarded as such. 
There are various possibilities that come to mind. For example, one could diffe-
rentiate according to the victims’ or public demand; the gravity of the committed 
crimes; or to the varying levels or roles of the perpetrators. 
As regards the first differentiator, there is the problem that recent experience 
shows that the victims’ demands for accountability and justice often, if not al-
ways, conflict with the mostly official efforts towards peace and reconciliation.217 
Empirical data show that the overwhelming majority of the victims demand ac-
countability in the form of criminal prosecutions, trials and punishment,218 and 
that they reject amnesty219. But as transitional justice aims primarily to reconstruct 
the society as a whole and to redress the individual victim only secondarily, this 
cannot be the crucial differentiator to distinguish between the various perpetrators. 
With regard to the second differentiator, one faces related problems. The core 
international crimes are all of such gravity that it is hardly possible to constitute a 
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hierarchy.220 The ICC Statute’s clear commitment to the fight against impunity is 
considered an expression of opinio iuris that amnesties for the ICC crimes are 
mostly prohibited221 and in most cases amnesty for war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and genocide has been excluded.222 
However, the best method to distinguish between different perpetrators is to con-
sider their varying levels of culpability and their status and role within the crime. 
The category of the “most responsible” is – having regard to hierarchical struc-
tures - considered to include the planners, leader and persons who committed the 
most serious crimes and who could also comprise the political, administrative and 
military leadership.223 Within this framework one could furthermore differentiate 
between principals and accessories, as well as the attempt and the completion of 
the crime. 
Although, at first glance, it could be unsatisfying for the victims seeing the “nor-
mal soldier” who “pulled the trigger” being granted amnesty even for the core 
international crimes, by proper public education aimed at making amnesty unders-
tandable224, governments could explain the chosen approach and convince their 
citizenry that for their country, finding itself in a particular situation, the future is 
more important than the past. Such targeted prosecutions would best reconcile 
peace and justice, and would also generally pass the complementarity test of the 
ICC Statute, therefore rendering the ICC’s intervention inadmissible.225 
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VIII. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the trend in international (criminal) law is moving in the direction 
of fighting against impunity rigorously. The establishment of the International 
Criminal Court symbolizes this development. Nevertheless, the same ICC will, 
one day, be compelled to address the question of whether or not to accept national 
grants of amnesty as a defence to prosecution for international crimes. 
Notwithstanding the enormous practical importance of exemptions from criminal 
prosecution within the framework of transitional justice, the current practice and 
debate suffers from a lack of clear rules and criteria that could help to reconcile 
peace and justice in situations of transition.226 This has to be changed. 
Although not much room exists in international law for amnesties, they stay a 
useful instrument for extreme and special situations, especially with regard to 
transitional phases. Immanuel Kant said: “The very concept of peace entails the 
idea of amnesty”227, but if used at all, any exception to punishment must be care-
fully and narrowly drawn.228 
From the discussion above, it follows that neither the restorative effect of amnesty 
and forgiveness should be overestimated, nor the notion of reconciling power of 
(criminal) justice underestimated.229 In my opinion, it is best to combine these two 
possible ways to deal with the past. By this is meant adopting the “selective pros-
ecution approach” as proposed in this study. 
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But finally, as every transition is different, requiring a consideration of the cir-
cumstances in each concrete situation,230 the tension between peace and justice 
will stay, and the closer a state’s situation approaches this tension, the more the 
government will be placed on the horns of a dilemma in deciding which way to 
go. 
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